Abstract-Cooperation between rational users has emerged as a new networking paradigm to improve the performance of wireless networks. In this paper, transmitter cooperation between wireless nodes in a Gaussian multiple access channel is studied under the framework of coalitional game theory. The stability of the grand coalition, the coalition of all users, is studied by modeling the game in partition form, in contrast to previous approaches using characteristic form games, in scenarios with infinite and finite cooperation capacity between transmitters. In both cases, irrespective of the channel gains, the grand coalition is shown to be the sum rate optimal and stable, in the sense that users do not have any incentive to leave the coalition.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nodes in a wireless network share resources due to the broadcast nature of the medium. Cooperation among such individual nodes allows the use of available resources to mutually enhance transmissions [1] - [3] and increase the achievable rate or improve the error probability. For example, the formation of virtual MIMO systems through cooperation among single antenna devices improves spectral efficiency.
The typical assumption in wireless networks is that all the nodes voluntarily cooperate with each other. However rational nodes may weigh the benefits against the costs of cooperation and may prefer to cooperate with only a small subset of users (coalitions) to maximize the utility they obtain. The study of coalition formation among users of a wireless network using the framework of coalitional game theory has been of great recent interest [2] - [7] .
Cooperative game theory has been applied to the Gaussian interference channel to compute the achievable rate region in several special cases. It has been shown that all the points on the boundary of the rate regions cannot be achieved as users could refuse to use common coding strategies; achievable rates using Nash-bargaining concepts have been derived in [7] , [8] . A second approach to the Gaussian interference channel uses coalitional game theory [2] to study transmitter and receiver cooperation among rational nodes. For multiple access channels (MAC), coalition formation among transmitters is modeled as a characteristic form game in which the utility of each coalition is computed by assuming jamming transmissions by members outside the coalition. Under the assumption of infinite cooperation capacity among coalition members, the game is shown to be cohesive and thus the grand coalition (GC) is the only feasible coalition structure. However, a This research has been funded in part by the following grants and organizations: NSF CCF-0917343, NSF IIS 0917410 and CAREER CNS-0954116.
negative result -the GC is not stable -is obtained due to the jamming assumption. The cost of transmission cooperation is modeled using partial decode and forward (PDF) signaling and the game is shown to be non-cohesive [2] .
In this paper, we revisit the problem of coalition formation among rational transmitters over a MAC channel. We consider two scenarios to model cooperation between members of a coalition: (1) transmitter cooperation with infinite capacity and (2) transmitter cooperation using finite capacity conferencing encoders. The first scenario is modeled as transferable utility (TU) game in partition form by explicitly considering the interference experienced by each coalition in contrast to a jamming game in characteristic form in [2] . We show that the GC is cohesive and thus the only feasible coalition structure. The stability of coalition games in partition form is characterized by defection functions [6] , [9] and we show that the GC is the stable coalition structure.
The second scenario assumes that transmitters in each coalition use error-free broadcast conferencing [10] , [11] . This scenario models the cost of cooperation by dividing the total power at each antenna between cooperation and transmission. This model assumes that the cooperative data broadcast by different transmitters in a coalition do not interfere with each other and is noise-free and thus differs from the PDF signaling used to model cooperation in [2] . The achievable rate region for conferencing encoders with finite capacity has been derived in [10] , [11] . We model this case as a non-transferable utility (NTU) game and by proving that the rate region achieved by any arbitrary partition is a subset of the rate region achieved by the GC, we show that transmitter cooperation game with finite cooperation capacity is also cohesive. As in the previous scenario, using defection functions, we show that the GC is the stable coalition structure for the transmitter cooperation game with finite capacity conferencing encoders. This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we define the signal model and the game theoretic concepts used in this paper. We study the stability of the GC of the transmitter cooperation game with infinite cooperation capacity in Section III and the game with finite cooperation capacity and broadcast conferencing in Section IV. Section V concludes the paper.
II. SIGNAL MODEL
In this section, we describe the system model and define the terms related to coalitional game theory that are used in the rest of the paper. Consider a wireless MAC scenario with K transmitters indexed by the set K = [1, 2, ..., K] and a common receiver with several antennas. All the links transmit data simultaneously, resulting in interference due to the broadcast nature of the wireless channel. The wireless link between any given TX and RX antenna is modeled by a channel with known gains and additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN). The received signal at the m th RX antenna is the sum of transmitted signals from all the transmitters over the fading channel and is expressed as
where h m,k is the channel gain between the k th transmitter and the m th receiver and the additive noise Z m is modeled by zero mean, independent, and identically distributed complex Gaussian random variables with variance N 0 . The transmitted signal X k is assumed to be drawn from a Gaussian codebook with an average per antenna power constraint given by
A. Signal Model with Transmitter Coalitions
Assuming that S 1 , S 2 , ..., S N , an arbitrary partition of the set of transmitters K, is the coalition structure, each coalition can be viewed as a |S n | input, K-output MIMO channel with per-antenna power constraints. In vector form, the received signal can then be expressed as
where H Sn is a K × |S n | channel gain matrix and X Sn is the signaling vector for the n th coalition with transmitters from S n and the AWGN noise can be modeled as Z K .
B. Game Theory Concepts
Let S ⊆ K denote any arbitrary coalition of transmitters. A partition of K is defined as a set of coalitions S 1 , S 2 , ..., S N such that S i ∩ S j = ∅, ∀i ̸ = j and ∪ N n=1 S n = S. The utility (value) achieved by the coalition S is denoted by v(S) and is, in general, dependent on the actions of all the members of K. A game in which the utility obtained by the coalition is unaffected by members outside it, is a game in characteristic form. When the utility depends on the specific partition of the set of players, then the game is said to be in partition form. In general, the amount of utility that a player i ∈ S receives from the division of v(S) constitutes the player's payoff and is denoted by p i . The vector p ∈ R |S| with each element being the payoff of a member of the coalition constitutes a payoff function.
A coalitional game is called a transferable utility (TU) game, if the cooperative gains achieved by a coalition can be arbitrarily divided among all the members of the coalition. If arbitrary division is not possible then the game is called a non-transferable utility (NTU) game.
Definition 1. A coalitional game with TU, defined on a finite set of players K, has a value v(S) associated with each subset of users S ⊂ K with v({∅}) = 0.

Definition 2. A coalitional game with NTU defined on a finite set of players K, is a set function defined on S ⊆ K such that v({∅}) = {0}, v(S) is a non-empty closed subset of R K
+ such that the components of the payoff tuples in v(S) whose indices correspond to players not in S can be arbitrary and for any length K vector
The general problem in coalitional game theory is to find the partition of K which maximizes the utility region of the players. It is clear that the number of possible partitions increases exponentially with |K| = K and hence finding the utility maximizing region is an NP-complete problem. The cohesive property of games greatly simplifies the problem in such scenarios.
Definition 3. A NTU coalitional game is cohesive if
. A cohesive game with TU or NTU results in a GC as all the users are incentivized to form a larger group which maximizes the total utility. Typically the study of cohesive games is to determine the stability of the GC, i.e., determining whether each users' payoff is maximized by the GC under the chosen fairness criterion [6] . However, determining the stable coalition structures for a game not in characteristic form is, in general, a very difficult problem [2] , [4] , [5] .
In this paper, we define the utility for TU games as the maximum sum rate obtained between the TX coalition and the K-antenna receiver, while for NTU games, the coalition utility is the largest achievable rate region where the maximization is performed over all input signaling strategies which satisfy the constraints imposed by the signaling strategy.
III. TRANSMITTER COOPERATION GAMES WITH INFINITE COOPERATION CAPACITY
In this section, we consider the TX cooperation game for transmitters with infinite cooperation capacity over a MAC channel assuming Gaussian signaling. We model the TX cooperation game in partition form in contrast to the model in [2] , where an unrealistic jamming assumption is made about all the other coalitions of the partition to model the game in characteristic form. We first illustrate the problem formulation in [2] to highlight the differences with our model.
A. Tx Cooperation Game -Jamming Model [2]
Cooperation games over wireless networks are in general not in characteristic form as the utility obtained by each coalition is a function of the interference from members outside the coalition. A jamming game which assumes worst case interference from every other coalition converts the game into characteristic form with TU as illustrated below. Each coalition of transmitters, designs its signaling scheme (choosing the transmit covariance matrix for Gaussian signaling) to maximize its sum rate assuming worst case interference.
] to denote the transmit covariance matrix of coalition S. For Gaussian signaling, the value v(S) achieved by a coalition S is defined as
The diagonal entries of Q S and Q S c are restricted to satisfy the individual power constraints on each transmit antenna. The utility obtained by each coalition is computed by assuming that all other coalitions form a group to jam the coalition and hence is less than the utility obtained by taking into account the actual interference of the signal. It is shown in [2] that under the jamming assumption, the TX cooperation game is cohesive and that the grand coalition (GC) is the only possible coalition structure. However, by using a counter example, it is shown in [2] that the GC is not a stable structure, i.e., there exists no feasible payoff profile in the core of the game (see [4] for the definition of stability notions of this game).
B. TX Cooperation Game -Non Jamming Model
We conjecture that the negative stability result for the GC in the TX cooperation game in [2] is due to the unrealistic jamming assumption used to reduce the game to characteristic form. To circumvent the jamming assumption, we formulate the TX cooperation game in partition form to take into account the actual interference seen by every coalition at the receiver. Hence the utility obtained by each coalition is now dependent on the signaling schemes adopted by the other coalitions of the partition of transmitters. Consider an arbitrary partition
where S −n denotes the set of all coalitions except n and Q * S−n is the optimal signaling strategy computed by all the other coalitions. From (4), we clearly observe that v(S n , S −n ) depends on the optimal signaling covariance matrices of the other coalitions. Evaluating the mutual information term, we get
By definition, each coalition adopts a signaling strategy which is the best response to the signaling strategies of all the other coalitions and hence the utility v(S n , S −n ) is the Nash equilibrium (NE) solution of the game. The existence of the NE solution is first proved using the Kakutani fixed point theorem [12] . Define the set
.e., A n is the set of all covariance matrices which satisfy the per antenna power constraint and A ≽ B → A − B is a positive semi-definite matrix. Clearly, A n is a closed and compact set. Using the fact that the elements of A n are covariance matrices, it can be shown that A n is a convex set. Hence the set of ntuples of covariance matrices defined by A = × N n=1 A n is closed, compact and convex. Now define the function
as the set of best responses by coalition S n to the signaling strategy Q S−n adopted by all the members of the partition. Finally define B : A → A to be the set valued function such that B (Q S1 , Q S2 , ..., Q S N 
Lemma 1 follows directly from the concavity of the logdet function and the proof of Lemma 2 can be derived using Lemma 1 in conjunction with the definition of B n (Q S−n ). Using Lemma 2, it can be shown that B(A) is convex and the closure of B(A) follows from the continuity property of the utility function. The set of n-tuples of covariance matrices A and the function B satisfy all the requirements of the Kakutani fixed point theorem ( [12] , p. 20) and hence there exists a fixed point of the set B(A) such that Q * Sn ∈ B n (Q * S−n ). The fixed point of this set guarantees the existence of a NE solution to the TX cooperation game with non jamming assumption.
Lemma 3. The TU transmitter-cooperation game is cohesive.
Proof: Let S 1 , S 2 , ..., S N be an arbitrary partition of K using the covariance matrices Q S1 , Q S2 , ..., Q SN for signaling. Using the chain rule of mutual information and the fact that conditioning does not increase entropy, the mutual information can be expanded as
, where Q * Sn is the set of covariance matrices that achieve the Nash equilibrium solution. The value attained by the grand coalition can then be lower bounded as
where Q * is the optimal covariance matrix when all the transmitters cooperate. This proves that the TX cooperation game is cohesive.
As the TX cooperation game is cohesive, the GC is the only possible coalitional structure. In contrast to [2] , we now prove the stability of the GC formed in the game.
C. Stability concepts for a coalition game in partition form
For games in partition form, the stability of the formed partition is studied using a defection function [5] . A defection function D is a function which associates with any arbitrary
stable if no group of players is interested in leaving T when the players who wish to leave can form the coalitions allowed by D.
Two important defection functions have been considered in the literature [6] and are restated in this paper. First, the D hp (T ) function which associates with each partition T of K the family of all partitions of K that can form by merging and splitting coalitions in T . This function allows any group of players to leave the partition T of K through merge-andsplit operations to create another partition of K. Second, the D c (T ) function which associates with each partition of K the family of all collections in K. This function allows any group of players to leave the partition T through any operation and create an arbitrary collection in K. A D c stable partition is the unique outcome of split and merge operations done on any partition of K and it is the partition which maximizes the social welfare of all the coalitions in a partition. 
, for all feasible input distributions (covariance matrices in our scenario) and show that the game is super-additive along the lines of the proof of cohesiveness. Any merge operation does not reduce the achievable payoff for any member of all the coalitions involved in the merge operation and every split operation does not increase the achievable payoff for any involved member. This shows that the every TX achieves a higher payoff as part of the GC than as a part of any other coalition and thus the GC is D hp stable.
D c stability: The necessary and sufficient conditions for the D c stability of a partition as given in [6] . The first condition directly follows from the proof of D hp stability of the GC. The second condition is as follows. For the partition T = {T 1 , T 2 , ..., T L }, a coalition G formed of players belonging to different T i ∈ T is T-incompatible if for no i ∈ {1, 2, ..., L} we have G ⊂ T i . D c stability of T requires that for any such coalition G, G ∩ T i is preferred over T i . For our scenario, we observe that no GC-incompatible coalitions can be constructed and hence the GC is D c stable.
We note that the stability of the GC in [2] is not guaranteed as super-additivity does not hold and each players' payoff may not increase when two coalitions merge, although the sum utility increases.
IV. TRANSMITTER COOPERATION GAMES WITH FINITE COOPERATION CAPACITY
In this previous section, we considered the problem of TX cooperation in a Gaussian MAC with infinite capacity links for cooperation between transmitters. In this section, we consider the general problem wherein the transmitters in each coalition are connected by finite capacity error-free broadcast links and the transmitters divide the total available power between cooperation and broadcasting. We model this game as an NTU game in which the utility obtained by each coalition cannot be divided arbitrarily among its members and is characterized by the achievable rate region for each coalition. The rate region for a Gaussian MAC with finite capacity conferencing encoders has been derived in [10] , [11] and is applied to our problem.
We first briefly describe the cooperation model among the members of each coalitions S i . Each transmitter has a message to be transmitted at a rate R i to the receiver with n channel uses. Now, each transmitter in S i is connected to other transmitters in S i with a error-free broadcast pipe of capacity given by the elements of the set C Sn . Prior to each block of n channel uses to transmit the message, the transmitters in each coalition hold a conference, where they exchange information over m uses of the broadcast pipe [10] , [11] . At the receiver, the signals of the transmitters in a coalition are jointly decoded and the signals from transmitters outside the coalition are treated as noise. Let us define the set G n ⊆ S n and G c n = S n − G n . From [10] , [11] , for a given input distribution, the rate region achievable by the n th coalition is given by the following constraint equations:
As mentioned in Definition 2, R Conf (U, X Sn ) determines the achievable rates corresponding to the transmitters of S n in the K-tuple (R 1 , R 2 , ..., R K ). The components of the tuple corresponding to all the other coalitions are arbitrary. The auxilary random variable U is Gaussian such that all the triplets (X i , U, X j ), i, j = 1, 2, ...K, i ̸ = j form a Markov chain (see [10] for a detailed description). The achievable rate region by the partition
, (8) and is the common region which satisfies the constraints of all the coalitions of the partition in addition to the overall sum rate constraint. The capacity region is obtained by all the convex hull over all feasible input distributions. Next, we compute the rate region achievable by the GC of all transmitters. From [10] , for a fixed input distribution we get
The capacity region is then the convex hull of the regions computed using all the valid input probability distributions. To prove that the grand TX cooperation game with finite cooperating capacity is cohesive, it is sufficient to show that for every input distribution, the R(S 1 , S 2 , ..., S N ) ⊆ R GC .
Lemma 4. The TX cooperation game with conferencing encoders of finite capacity is cohesive.
Proof: To prove that R (S 1 , S 2 , . .., S N ) ⊆ R GC for any feasible input probability distribution, the following procedure is used. We choose an arbitrary set of rate constraints describing R (S 1 , S 2 , ..., S N ) and add and outer bound them. The resulting equation is categorized into one of two groups. The first group has the equations which match the rate constraints of R GC (K) and the second group has the equations which do not belong the first group. We illustrate the above described procedure with two examples: one for each group. For the first example, let G 1 ⊆ S 1 and G 2 ⊆ S 2 and consider the rate constraints corresponding to
Adding both the equations and outer bounding them, we get
Clearly, Equation (10) , an outer bound on the constraints of R(S 1 , S 2 , ..., S N ), is a rate constraint for R GC (K). Similarly, it can be shown that by choosing the right set of equations, all the constraints describing R GC (K) can be derived by outer bounding sums of equations describing R(S 1 , S 2 , ..., S N ) and thus R(S 1 , S 2 , ..., S N ) ⊆ R GC .
Next we derive a constraint that belongs to the second group. For i = 1, 2, consider the rate constraints
The outer bound for the above rate constraint can be derived as ∑ j∈S1∪S2 R j ≤ I(X S1 ; Y ) + I(X S1 ; Y ) which is a bound constraining further the region R (S 1 , S 2 , ..., S N ) . Several such bounds can be derived for various choices of rate constraints. This clearly constraints R(S 1 , S 2 , ..., S N ) further and thus for every feasible input distribution we have shown that R(S 1 , S 2 , ..., S N ) ⊆ R GC . Hence, the GC of the TX cooperation game with finite conferencing capacity is cohesive. Proof: D hp stability: To show that the GC is stable, we consider an arbitrary partition S 1 , S 2 , ..., S N of K. Using the same technique to prove the cohesiveness of the game, it can be shown that merging two coalitions does not decrease the achievable rate (payoff) for any transmitter and splitting a coalition does not increase the rates achieved. Hence the GC of the game is D hp stable.
D c stability: As in the scenario for TX cooperation with infinite capacity, the first condition for D c stability trivially follows from the proof of D hp stability. The second condition requires the construction of at least one GC incompatible coalition. As no GC incompatible coalitions can be constructed, the GC is D c stable.
Finally, note that the case of TX cooperation game in Section III can be treated as a special case of the game in Section IV when all the conferencing capacities approach infinity. However, both the models would differ due to the TU-vs-NTU nature of the games considered.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The problem of coalition formation for transmitter cooperation over a Gaussian multiple access channel is considered and modeled as a characteristic form game, where the achievable rate of each coalition is dependent on the strategies adopted by the other coalitions. Two scenarios in which the transmitters have finite and infinite capacity links connecting the members of the each coalition are considered. It is shown that the cooperation game is cohesive in both cases, i.e., the grand coalition is the only possible coalition and through defection functions, the grand coalition is shown to be a stable coalition.
